Abstract. We present an efficient construction of Yao's "garbled circuits" protocol for securely computing any two-party circuit on committed inputs. The protocol is secure in a universally composable way in the presence of malicious adversaries under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) and strong RSA assumptions, in the common reference string model. The protocol requires a constant number of rounds (four-five in the standard model, two-three in the random oracle model, depending on whether both parties receive the output), O(|C|) modular exponentiations per player, and a bandwidth of O(|C|) group elements, where |C| is the size of the computed circuit. Our technical tools are of independent interest. We propose a homomorphic, semantically secure variant of the Camenisch-Shoup verifiable cryptosystem, which uses shorter keys, is unambiguous (it is infeasible to generate two keys which successfully decrypt the same ciphertext), and allows efficient proofs that a committed plaintext is encrypted under a committed key. Our second tool is a practical four-round (two-round in ROM) protocol for committed oblivious transfer on strings (string-COT) secure against malicious participants. The string-COT protocol takes a few exponentiations per player, and is UC-secure under the DCR assumption in the common reference string model. Previous protocols of comparable efficiency achieved either committed OT on bits, or standard (non-committed) OT on strings.
Introduction
Informally, a two-party protocol for computing a circuit is secure if participants do not learn anything from the protocol execution beyond what is revealed by the output of the circuit. In a seminal paper, Andrew Yao showed a "garbled circuit" protocol [Yao86] for secure two-party computation (2PC) of any circuit in the semi-honest model, i.e., assuming that participants faithfully follow the protocol specification. Yao's protocol requires O(|C|) symmetric-key operations, and its bandwidth is O(|C|) symmetric-key ciphertexts, in addition to the cost of n instances of an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, where n is the size of the circuit's inputs. Using a 2-round OT protocol, Yao's protocol takes only two communication rounds (assuming only one player receives the output).
The main contribution of this paper is a new variant of Yao's protocol, which replaces O(|C|) symmetric-key operations with O(|C|) public-key operations, and at this cost achieves security against malicious participants in the common reference string (CRS) model. Specifically, our protocol operates on a multiplicative group Z n is a safe RSA modulus which satisfies DCR and strong RSA assumptions. The protocol requires O(|C|) modular exponentiations, its bandwidth is O(|C|) elements in Z ZK proofs for showing that the parties run this string-OT protocol on the previously committed inputs.
The sCS encryption has further useful properties which allow us to extend the string-COT protocol to an efficient committed 2PC protocol. First, it is unambiguous, in the sense that it is committing not only to the plaintext, but also to the encryption key: it is infeasible to produce a ciphertext that can be successfully decrypted, even to the same plaintext, under two different decryption keys. This property is crucial in the maliciously secure version of Yao's protocol. Otherwise, the player who creates the garbled circuit could embed all sorts of faults into the circuit. If the circuit evaluator encounters a fault which causes him to stop, the malicious player will learn information about the evaluator's inputs that he is not supposed to learn.
Second, we extend the Camenisch-Shoup ZK proof system to an efficient ZK proof that a ciphertext encrypts a committed plaintext under a committed key. (Technically, this proof system is defined for a symmetric-key version of the sCS encryption, where the key is both an encryption and a decryption key.) This proof system is a crucial component of proving that Yao's "garbled circuit" is formed correctly. Yao's construction of the garbled circuit involves encrypting, for every circuit gate, the keys corresponding to the output wires under the keys corresponding to the input wires. In our version of Yao's protocol, the sender commits to the keys he created for every circuit wire. For the wires corresponding to the receiver's inputs, the sender sends to the receiver the appropriate key values using our efficient string-COT protocol operating on these commitments. Furthermore, the sender must prove, for each gate, that the ciphertexts that are supposed to encrypt the appropriate output-wire keys under the appropriate input-wire keys are formed correctly. This is accomplished precisely by the above proof system, because the input-wire keys appear as keys in these ciphertexts, while the output-wires keys appear as plaintexts.
Giving an efficient ZK proof system for this statement for some version of the CS encryption scheme is an interesting technical challenge, because in the CS cryptosystem plaintexts and keys "live" in different groups (and are acted upon by different moduli). It is not immediately obvious how to encrypt one CS encryption key under another CS encryption key and have an efficient proof of correctness for this encryption, because the efficient proof systems given for the CS encryption require that the plaintext be significantly smaller than the encryption key. One solution is to extend these proof systems to handle larger plaintexts (namely, plaintexts of the same size as the key), using proofs of equality of elements of two different groups represented as integers (e.g., [Bou00] ). We propose a simpler solution based on the observation that, from the results of Håstad, Schrift and Shamir [HSS93] on simultaneous bit security of exponentiation in groups of unknown order, it follows that one can shorten the private keys used in the CS encryption to |n| 2 bits. This significantly speeds up the CS encryption, but, more importantly, this modification allows for a very efficient ZK proof that a ciphertext encrypts a committed plaintext under a committed key. Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we discuss related work. In Section 3, we describe our cryptographic toolkit. In Section 4, we present the string-COT protocol, and in Section 5, the protocol for general two-party secure computation on committed inputs. All proofs have been delegated to the full version of the paper.
2PC using cut-and-choose approach. A recent series of works on efficient constantround 2PC protocols [Pin03, MF06, LP07, Woo07] shows that security in the malicious model can be achieved by cut-and-choose verification of the entire garbled circuit, at the cost of O(s|C| + s 2 n) [LP07] or O(s|C|) [Woo07] symmetric-key operations, where s is the statistical security parameter of cut-and-choose and n is the input size. These cut-and-choose constructions probably require less computation than our protocol to achieve similar levels of security based on common assumptions, but our protocol may require less bandwidth, especially for small circuits whose size is comparable to the input size. Also, our protocol can be made non-interactive in the random oracle model at no extra cost, while the security parameter s in the cut-and-choose solutions increases if they are made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
COT. Committed OT (COT) was introduced by Crépeau [Cré89] , where it was used to construct a general 2PC protocol (but not constant-round one) following the approach of [GMW87] . Crépeau constructed COT using black-box invocations of Ω(n 3 ) OTs. This was improved by [CvdGT95] to O(n) OT's and O(n 2 ) bit commitments. Both COT protocols, however, operate on bits rather than strings. Based on the concrete assumptions of Computational or Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Cramer and Damgård [CD97] and then Garay et al. [GMY04] give COT protocols which require O(1) exponentiations but still operate only on bits, while Camenisch and Cachin [CC00] give a string-COT protocol, but it requires O(k) modular exponentiations where k is the security parameter.
Lipmaa [Lip03] proposed to extend the (non-committed) string-OT protocol of Aiello et al. [AIR01] to a committed OT protocol on strings at the cost of O(1) exponentiations. While this protocol does ensure that the received string is consistent with the sender's commitment, the sender can successfully cheat on the string that has not been transferred during the OT. This can be used to break chooser's privacy in any application (such as 2PC) where the sender can observe whether the chooser succesfully completed the protocol. Stronger verifiability can potentially be achieved by extending this protocol with zero-knowledge proofs, but the resulting protocol would not beat the O(k) modular exponentiations bound because the commitment schemes (e.g., [CGHGN01] ) suggested in [Lip03] seem to have only cut-and-choose ZK proofs.
Cryptographic Tools

Camenisch-Shoup (CS) encryption scheme [CS03]
Common reference string. A trusted third party generates a safe RSA modulus n = pq, where p = 2p ′ + 1, q = 2q ′ + 1, |p| = |q|, p = q, and p, q, p ′ , q ′ are all primes, a random element g ′ in Z * n 2 and an element g = (g ′ ) 2n . The common reference string is (n, g), which also implicitly defines element α = 1 + n. For standalone applications of CS encryption, pair (n, g) can be thought of as part of the public key. However, placing (n, g) in the CRS enables soundness of some very useful proof systems associated with this encryption scheme, e.g., those used in our COT and 2PC protocols.
The group Z * n 2 defined by the safe RSA modulus n can be decomposed into a crossproduct of four subgroups: Z * n 2 = G n × G n ′ × G 2 × T , where group G n , generated by α = n + 1, has order n, group G n ′ has order n ′ = p ′ q ′ , and G 2 and T are subgroups of order 2. As one consequence of this structure of Z * n 2 , the above procedure of picking g as a 2n-power of a random element implies that, with an overwhelming probability, g is a generator of subgroup G n ′ . In the following we treat all multiplications and exponentiations as operations in Z * n 2 , unless stated otherwise. Key generation. The private key is a random triple x 1 , x 2 , x 3 chosen in [0,
, and hk is a key of a collision-resistant keyed hash function H.
Encryption. Consider plaintext m as an integer in
, is a tuple (u, e, v) where u = g r , e = α m g r , and v = abs((hf ]. Decryption. Proceeds exactly like CS decryption, but omitting the CCA checks on v (since there's no v here), and using x instead of x 1 in decrypting (u, e).
Apart from stripping the CCA check, the only difference between CS and sCS encryption is the shortened private key. The fact that the scheme remains semantically secure with such modification follows from adapting the results of [HSS93] on simultaneous bit security of exponentiation modulo a Blum integer (and a safe RSA modulus is Blum integer) to exponentiation in Z * n 2 . 4 It follows that under the factoring assumption, the entire upper half of the bits of exponent x is simultaneously hidden under the exponentiation function y = g x mod n 2 , and therefore key y = g
5 Theorem 1. sCS encryption is semantically secure under DCR assumption on safe RSA moduli.
Symmetric-key version of sCS encryption scheme. The sCS cryptosystem can also be used as a symmetric encryption scheme if the private key x ∈ [0, 2 k ′′ ] is treated as a symmetric key. Encryption of m under key x is a pair (e, u), where e = α m u x mod n 2 , u = g r for random r ∈ [0, n 4 ]. The decryption procedure does not change, nor does the security of the encryption scheme.
Unambiguity of sCS encryption. We introduce a very strong notion of unambiguous encryption, which applies to both public-key and symmetric schemes. It says that a ciphertext that passes a certain proof system, denoted ZKUnEnc, cannot decrypt to two different plaintexts under two different private keys. Moreover, no two distinct decryption keys can decrypt a ciphertext even to the same plaintext. Therefore, in an unambiguous encryption scheme, the ciphertext is committing not only to the plaintext, but also to the decryption key. This notion of encryption unambiguity is essential for our version of Yao's 2PC protocol, because otherwise a malicious creator of the garbled circuit could introduce errors in this circuit, and then learn something extra about the receiver's inputs by observing whether the receiver successfully completes his computation on this circuit. Definition 1. An encryption scheme is unambiguous if there exists a zero-knowledge proof system ZKUnEnc s.t. for every efficient probabilistic algorithm A, the following event has only negligible probability: (1) A outputs tuple (c, x 1 , x 2 ) s.t. x 1 = x 2 , (2) A passes the ZKUnEnc proof system on ciphertext c, (3) x 1 , x 2 are valid private keys, i.e., they are accepted by the decryption procedure, and (4) both Dec x1 (c) and Dec x2 (c) output a valid message (or messages). In the CRS model, the probability is also taken over the randomness of the common reference string generation.
Theorem 2. sCS encryption is unambiguous under the factoring assumption on safe RSA moduli, in the CRS model.
The ZK proof system ZKUnEnc for the sCS encryption is the proof that u 2 belongs to the group generated by g, i.e., ZKUnEnc(u, e) = ZKDL(g, u). (See section 3.4.)
CS commitments and sCS commitments
Our COT and 2PC protocols could be adapted to work with standard Pedersen-like commitment schemes of [Ped91, FO97, DF02] at the cost of additional mappings, via range proofs [CM99, Bou00, DF02] , between commitments with different ranges of plaintexts. Instead, we use the full (i.e., adaptive chosen-ciphertext secure) CS encryption as a commitment scheme, because it operates on the same group as the encryption we use, and hence is well-suited for both the COT and 2PC protocols of Sections 4 and 5.
6 Moreover, using a CCA-secure encryption as a commitment helps in showing that the COT and 2PC schemes are secure in the strong sense of universal composability.
An instance of a CS commitment scheme is a CS encryption public key P K = (n, g, g, h, f, hk). The public key is chosen by a trusted third party, and security of this commitment scheme requires the CRS model. The CS commitment on message m, an integer in range [− n 2 , n 2 ] (with an obvious mapping to Z n ), with label L, is the ciphertext Com = CSenc L P K (m). For notational convenience of the COT and 2PC protocols, we denote the tuple forming commitment Com as (u, C, v), i.e., u = g r , C = α m g r , and v = abs((hf
The decommitment is the (r, m, L) tuple. In the COT and 2PC protocols, we often treat value C in the CS commitment as a commitment to m by itself. This shortened commitment is used very heavily in the 2PC protocol, thus we refer to value C = α m g r by itself as an sCS commitment. The corresponding decommitment is (m, r).
Efficient concurrently secure ZK proof systems in the CRS model
All proof systems used in our COT and Committed 2PC protocols are concurrently secure ZK proofs in the CRS model. Specifically, each proof system is computationally sound and statistical zero-knowledge with a straight-line simulator. The latter is important for showing that the protocols are universally composable. Each of these proof systems is built from efficient HVZK proof systems for the languages listed below by a series of compilations which preserve the efficiency of the underlying HVZK protocols.
The compilations start from 3-round HVZK proof systems with the properties of special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and (weak) special soundess (we discuss these below). First, with the techniques of Cramer et al. [CDS94] , HVZK systems of this class can be combined, at no extra cost, into HVZK proof systems of the same class for any (monotonic) disjunctive and/or conjuctive formula over statements proved in the component proof systems. Then, using Damgård [Dam02] , the resulting HVZK proof system can be compiled into a three-round concurrently secure ZK proof systems with statistical zero-knowledge, computational soundness, and a straight-line simulator in the CRS model. This latter technique requires statistically hiding trapdoor commitments, and using Pedersen's commitment scheme it incurs a computational overhead of just one extra exponentiation per player. The computational soundness of the resulting ZK proof system is subject to the same assumption as the computational binding of the commitment scheme, which can be Strong RSA if Pedersen's trapdoor commitment is adapted to the Z * n 2 setting, e.g., as in Damgård-Fujisaki commitments [DF02] . Note that in ROM, using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the HVZK proof systems of this class can be converted at no extra cost to non-interactive ZKs with the same properties of computational soundness and statistical zero-knowledge with straight-line simulation.
We denote the statements being proved as X, Y, Z, and the corresponding "atomic" HVZK proof systems as HVZKX, HVZKY, HVZKZ. We use a notation derived from boolean formulas for the ZK proof systems resulting from this series of compilations. For example, the resulting ZK proof system for language X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) will be denoted ZKX∧ (ZKY ∨ ZKZ). We catalog the proof systems used in the COT and 2PC protocols by the statements they prove, namely, membership in the languages DL, DLEQ, NotEq, Cot, Com, and PlainEq. Each of these is parameterized by tuple (n, g, g, h, f, hk), which forms an instance of the CS commitment scheme. Triple (n, g, g) also defines an instance of the sCS commitment. Parameters k, k ′ , k ′′ are as in Section 3.2.
In other words, C a and C b are sCS commitments to two different values.
′2 = e 2s α 2m−i * 2s y 2r , and u ′2 = u 2s g 2r }. In other words, m rem n is committed in sCS commitment C, and (u ′ , e ′ ) is a correct "re-encryption" of m performed by the sender in the COT protocol, given the (y, u, e) tuple sent by the receiver. Com = {(Com, ids) | there exist m, r s.t. Com = (u, C, v) where u = g r , C = α m g r , and v = abs((hf H hk (u,C,ids) ) r )}. In other words, Com is a properly formed CS commitment to some message m with label ids.
In other words, (e, u) is an sCS encryption of the plaintext m committed in (sCS commitment) C m under the key x committed in C x .
All of the above languages have efficient 3-round HVZK proof systems HVZKDL, HVZKDLEQ, etc., which unconditionally satisfy the two properties we need: (1) special HVZK, and (2) weak special soundness. The only exception is HVZKPlainEq, for which we show that weak special soundness holds under the strong RSA assumption. All systems are efficient: the players make only a few exponentiations (between one and four) modulo n 2 , and communication complexity ranges from 3|n| in HVZKDL to at most 20|n| bits in HVZKPlainEq. We show the HVZKPlainEq proof system in Appendix A, because it has the most novelty. We delegate the other proof systems to the full version of the paper, but most of them are either standard, or simple modifications of the proofs that appear in [CS03] . The HVZKPlainEq proof system shown in Appendix A gives a good idea of how all of these HVZKs work.
Special HVZK and (weak) special soundness. Let (P 1 , P 2 , V ) be a specification of a 3-round public coin proof system for language L. The prover's message in the first round on instance x, witness w for x ∈ L, and randomness r is computed as a = P 1 (x, w, r), its response in the third round is computed as z = P 2 (x, w, r, e) where e is the verifier's challenge, and the verifier accepts if and only if V (x, a, e, z) = 1. We call this proof system special (statistical) HVZK if there exists a simulator S s.t. for every challenge e and every witness (x, w) for x ∈ L, the tuple (a, z) output by S(z, e) is distributed statistically close to tuple (a, z) where a = P 1 (x, w, r) and z = P 2 (x, w, r, e). The probability is over the coins of S and over r. We say that this proof system has (weak) special soundness if for every x ∈ L, and for every PPT algorithmP , the probability thatP (x) outputs (a, e, z, e ′ , z ′ ) s.t. e = e ′ and V (x, a, e, z) = V (x, a, e ′ , z ′ ) = 1, is negligible. Since the HVZK proof systems we use are parametrized by a reference string, the adversaryP takes the CRS as an input and the probability is taken over the choice of the CRS and the adversary's coins. This notion of (weak) special soundness is weaker than the special soundness assumed by the compilers of [CDS94, Dam02] , but it's easy to see that the same compilers still apply to this weaker class of HVZKs.
UC-Secure Committed Oblivious Transfer on Strings
Our protocol P cot for 1-out-of-2 committed oblivious transfer (COT) on strings is similar to the 1-out-of-2 non-committed string-OT protocol of Aiello et al. [AIR01] , but instead of multiplicatively homomorphic ElGamal encryption, P cot uses additively homomorphic and verifiable sCS encryption, which enables succinct (constant number of exponentiations) proofs that receiver's and sender's inputs into OT match their previous commitments. Moreover, P cot is universally composable in the CRS model.
We define the ideal functionality F COT for a COT scheme, and show that P cot securely realizes it. In contrast to the ideal COT functionality proposed by Garay et al. [GMY04] , our functionality F COT runs on strings rather than bits. However, F COT is more restricted than the functionality of [GMY04] in that (1) the obliviously transferred values are the plaintexts of commitments, not full decommitments; and (2) F COT
Ideal functionality FCOT for committed oblivious transfer on strings (COT)
Commit: Upon receiving a ComMsg, (Pi, cid), m message from Pi, FCOT records the ((Pi, cid), m) pair and broadcasts Committed, (Pi, cid) . Here m can be either a message in the prescribed message space or a special symbol ⊥. StartCOT: Upon receiving msg = StartCOT, (PS, PR, sid, cidR, cidS,0, cidS,1) from PR, FCOT verifies that it has records ((PR, cidR), mR), ((PS, cidS,0), mS,0), and ((PS, cidS,1), mS,1), and that mR =⊥. If this fails, FCOT ignores this message; otherwise, FCOT records msg and forwards it to PS. CompleteCOT: Upon receiving CompleteCOT, (PS, PR, sid, cidR, cidS,0, cidS,1) from PS, FCOT verifies that it has a record StartCOT, ids , where ids = (PS, PR, sid, cidR, cidS,0, cidS,1). FCOT looks up records ((PS, cidS,0), mS,0) and ((PS, cidS,1), mS,1), and checks if mS,0 =⊥ and mS,1 =⊥. If anything fails, FCOT ignores this message. Otherwise FCOT looks up the record ((PR, cidR), mR) (observe that such a record must exist). If mR / ∈ {0, 1}, FCOT sends a special message COTFailed, PS, PR, sid to PR. Otherwise FCOT sends CompleteCOT, ids, (m S,b , b) to PR for b = mR.
Note: Additionally, FCOT screens outs duplicates in commitment identifiers cid for every Pi, and in COT instance identifiers sid for every (PS, PR) pair.
Fig. 1. FCOT ideal functionality
does not support opening of the committed values. Nevertheless, F COT can ensure that any combination of COT instances is executed on same committed inputs, and thus it can ensure that whenever COT is used as part of any security protocol, the parties' inputs into COT are consistent across multiple COT instances.
The COT protocol P cot is given in fig. 2 . It assumes a common reference string picked by the trusted third party, which defines an instance P K of the CS commitment scheme. The message space for this COT scheme is [− n 2 , n 2 ], the message space of the CS commitment scheme. The commitment, identified as cid, of player P i on message m is a CS commitment Com = CSenc ids P K (m) with label ids = (P i , cid). As we will argue, P cot is a secure realization of F COT ; in particular, the receiver either outputs message m σ committed in Com S,σ , or rejects.
The two proof systems used in P cot involve conjunctions of Com, DLEQ, and Cot statements. As explained in Section 3.4, such proofs are computationally sound ZK proofs which are concurrently secure in the CRS model. Each takes only a few exponentiations and three communication rounds. Moreover, the messages in both proofs (P R to P S and P S to P R ) can be piggy-backed, with the statements proved by the two players delayed to the last messages, which results in a 4-round protocol. In the random oracle model these proofs are non-interactive and the protocol takes only 2 rounds.
Theorem 3. Under the DCR assumption, protocol P cot is a UC-secure realization of the Committed-OT functionality F COT in the CRS model, if the proof systems involved
Protocol Pcot for committed oblivious transfer on strings Common Reference String: CS commitment instance P K = (n, g, g, h, f, hk).
Commit: For player Pi, on commitment instance cid and message m: Player Pi sets ids = (Pi, cid), Com = CSenc ids P K (m), and broadcasts ComMsg, ids, Com . Receiver PR executes a COT instance sid with sender PS. PR's bit σ is committed in ComR, PS's messages m0, m1 are committed in ComS,0, ComS,1. Let cidR, cidS,0, cidS,1 be the identifiers for these commitments.
COT
Step 1: PR sets ids = (PS, PR, sid, cidR, cidS,0, cidS,1), retrieves ComR = (ũ, C,ṽ) and its decommitment r ∈ [0,
], and computes y = g x , u = g r , e = α σ y r PR sends COTMsg1, ids, (u, e, y) to PS, and performs as the prover in the proof system ZKDLEQ(g, u, g/y, C/e) ∧ ZKCom(P K, ComR, (PR, cidR)) with PS.
Step 2: Upon receiving COTMsg1, ids, (u, e, y) from PR, PS retrieves messages m0, m1 committed in ComS 0 = (ũ0, C0,ṽ0) and ComS 1 = (ũ1, C1,ṽ1). Note that Ci = α m i g rm i for some rm i . PS creates two "COT-encryptions" for i = 0, 1:
]. If PR passed its proof in Step 1, PS sends message COTMsg2, ids, (u0, e0, u1, e1) to PS, and performs with PR as the verifier a proof system ZKCot(0, e0, u0, e, u, y, C0) ∧ ZKCot(1, e1, u1, e, u, y, C1) ∧ ZKCom(ComS,0, (PS, cidS 0 )) ∧ ZKCom(ComS,1, (PS, cidS 1 )).
Step 3: PR decrypts the sCS ciphertext (uσ, eσ) and obtains mσ. If PS passed its proof in step 2, then PR outputs mσ; otherwise PR rejects.
Note: Either player rejects if the values he receives are visibly not in Z * n 2 , i.e., they are outside the [1, n 2 ] range or are divisible by n. Due to lack of space, we present only the crucial aspects of the proof.
Verifiability of inputs.
By computational soundness of the proof systems, the players cannot, except with negligible probability, enter different values σ, m 0 , m 1 into the OT protocol than those they previously committed. This is easy to see for the cheating receiver P R . For the cheating sender P S , by soundness of ZKCot, if P R accepts, then, with overwhelming probability, for each i there exists a tuple (m i , r mi , s i , r i ) s.t.
, where Com i = (ũ i , C i ,ṽ i ) is P S 's commitment whose id is cid S,i . In particular, m i is the message committed in Com i . Since for honest P R , e = α σ y r and u = g r , it follows that for i = σ we have e Receiver's and sender's privacy. Receiver's privacy follows from semantic security of CS encryption, while the sender's privacy relies on the fact that if P R 's commitment Com R = (ũ, C,ṽ) and the tuple (u, e, y) in P R 's COT message are correctly formed (and they are, except for negligible probability, if P S accepts P R 's ZKCom and ZKDLEQ proofs, and if the factoring assumption holds), and if σ is a value that satisfies e 2 = α 2σ g 2r for some r (there exists such σ for every e ∈ Z * n 2 ), then the pairs (e 0 , u 0 ) and (e 1 , u 1 ) sent by P S reveal m σ , but information-theoretically hide m i for i = σ. Observe first that if tuples (ũ, C,ṽ) and (u, e, y) are accepted by the verifier (i.e., each element is in Z n 2 , but is not a multiple of n), then under the factoring assumption, which is implied by the DCR assumption, all these elements are also in Z * n 2 , except for negligible probability. Second, if P R passes the ZKCom proof on Com R and the ZKDLEQ proof on (u, e, y), then except for negligible probability we have e = ω 0 α σ g r , u = ω 1 g r , and y = ω 2 g x for some (σ, r, x) and some elements ω 0 , ω 1 , ω 2 of order 2 in Z * n 2 . Therefore, values (u i , e i ) sent by P S are equal to e i = α mi+si(σ−i) y sir+ri and u i = g sir+ri , because s i is even. Note that for any σ, gcd(σ − i, n) = 1 for either i = 0 or i = 1 (or for both). Since the order of α is n, and (s i mod n) is distributed uniformly in Z n , value α mi+si(σ−i) is distributed uniformly in the subgroup generated by α in Z * n 2 . Because (1) the orders of g and y are both divisors of 2n ′ , (2) s i r + r i is even, and (3) (r i mod n ′ ) is distributed statistically close to uniform over Z n ′ , it follows that pair (g sir+ri , y sir+ri ) is distributed statistically close to (g
, and thus it is statistically independent of m i .
Construction of the straight-line simulator. The proof that protocol P cot UC-realizes the COT functionality F COT involves construction of a straight-line simulator, which pretends to follow the protocol on behalf of the uncorrupted parties by executing it on some fixed values unrelated to the real inputs of these parties, and simulates their proof systems using their straight-line simulators. Moreover, the simulator straightline extracts the effective inputs contributed by the corrupted players by choosing the Camenisch-Shoup public key P K embedded in the CRS and decrypting these players' inputs from their commitments. The simulator submits these extracted inputs to the ideal functionality if the corrupted players pass the associated ZK proofs. CCA security of Camenisch-Shoup encryption implies that the ciphertexts contained in the commitments and COT messages created by the simulator remain indistinguishable from the corresponding ciphertexts created in the real protocol, even if the simulator accesses the decryption oracle (to extract the values committed by the corrupt players). Finally, the proof systems performed by the corrupted players are sound even if the simulator picks the CRS because as long as the adversary passes its proofs only on correct statements, the simulation is distributed statistically close to the real execution. Hence, by the standard soundness of the proof systems involved, the adversary has only negligible probability of passing some proof on an incorrect statement in the simulation.
We present an efficient version of Yao's "garbled circuits" protocol for secure twoparty computation (2PC). The protocol operates on committed inputs and is universally composable (in the CRS model). In addition to any two-party secure computation in the malicious model, our protocol can be used, for example, to ensure that multiple instances of secure computation are executed on consistent inputs. The ideal functionality F 2PC for secure two-party computation on committed inputs in shown in fig. 3 . Abstracting from the bookkeeping details, F 2PC is a simple generalization of the standard secure computation functionality where two players send their respective inputs x and y to the trusted third party F, who returns the result of evaluating some circuit C(x, y) to one or both players.
The committed 2PC functionality F 2PC accepts any number of commitments from parties P 1 , . . . , P n , which are intended to represent the commitments to the bits encoding these parties' inputs into some two-party computation protocols. For every commitment, F 2PC records the committed bit. If some party P R requests secure computation of some circuit C with another party P S , the request specifies C and a vector of commitments to P R 's and P S 's inputs into this circuit. If party P S accedes to this request, F 2PC sends to P R the output of circuit C computed on the inputs committed in the specified commitments. Note that our F 2PC sends the output only to P R , but since this is a committed 2PC functionality, the players can simply reverse the roles and request that the same C be computed on the same vector of commitments, in order to enable P S to receive the output. (Our actual 2PC protocol allows P S to receive the output with no computational overhead and one extra communication round.)
We assume that the circuit C consists of binary two-input gates G = {g 1 , . . . , g c } with unbounded fan-out but no cycles, connected by wires W = {w 1 , . . . , w m }. Some subset W S of n s input wires are designated as P S 's inputs, and n r input wires form the set W R of P R 's inputs. Some subset W O of the output wires is designed as outputs for P R . (Optionally, some output wires can also be designated as outputs for P S .)
The Committed 2PC protocol is in fig. 4 . It is similar to the COT protocol of Section 4, and uses the same commitments and same message pattern, requiring 4 rounds in CRS and 2 rounds in ROM. In the first message, the receiver uses the proof systems of the P cot protocol and an additional proof system ZKBit(C) = (ZKDL(g, C) ∨ ZKDL(g, C/α)) for proving that the CS commitment Com = (u, C, v) or the sCS commitment C are commitments to a bit. In the second message, the sender creates the garbled circuit and uses the CorrectYao proof system to prove that it has been formed correctly. This step encompasses the entire Yao's construction and is discussed below. In the following, we denote sender P S as S and receiver P R as R. COTs on receiver's wire keys: S completes n r instances of the COT protocol on the wire keys corresponding to receiver's wires: for each i = 1, .., n r , S enters keys (x wi 0 , x wi 1 ) as a sender in the COT protocol, where w i designates the receiver's i th input
Ideal functionality F2PC for two-party secure computation on committed inputs
Commit: Upon receiving a ComMsg, (Pi, cid), m message from Pi, F2PC verifies that this cid has not been used by Pi before, records the ((Pi, cid), m) pair and broadcasts a Committed, (Pi, cid) message. Message m is either a message in the prescribed message space, or a special symbol ⊥.
Start2PC: Upon receiving msg = Start2PC, (PS, PR, sid, cidS1, . . . , cidSn s , cidR1, . . . , cidRn r , C)
from PR, F2PC verifies that (i) this sid has not been used by PS and PR before; (ii) for every index k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ ns, F2PC has a unique record ((PS, cid Sk ), m Sk ) (these commitments correspond to PS's inputs into the protocol); (iii) for every index l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ nr, F2PC has a unique record ((PR, cid Rl ), m Rl ) and that m Rl ∈ {0, 1} (these commitments correspond to PR's inputs into the protocol), and (iv) C is a description of a circuit that takes ns + nr bits as inputs. If this fails, F2PC ignores this message; otherwise, it records msg and forwards it to PS. Note: This is a functionality for one-directional two-party computation, where only the receiver PR learns the output. Because both parties are committed to their inputs, they can run another instance of the same protocol with the roles of PS and PR reversed. wire. This way, for every w ∈ W r , the receiver obtains the wire key x w bw where b w is his input bit on wire w. Technically, S computes tuple (u 0 (wi) , e 0 (wi) , u 1 (wi) , e 1 (wi) ) by following the sender's algorithm in Step 2 of P cot on tuple (u (i) , e (i) , y (i) ) and a pair of messages (x 0 wi , x 1 wi ), and their corresponding sCS commitments (C 0 wi , C 1 wi ).
Receiver's output wires: For every receiver's output wire w ∈ W 0 , S creates a pair of ciphertexts E 
Forming the garbled truth tables:
The following process is repeated for every gate g ∈ G. Let A and B be the input wires of g, and C the output wire. Let C 
2PC
Step 1: To trigger instance sid of the protocol in order to compute circuit C on commitment instances cidS1, . . . , cidSn s made by PS and commitments cidR1, . . . , cidRn r made by PR, the receiver PR prepares nr messages, each computed as in Step 1 of Pcot ( fig. 2) : for each i = 1, .., nr, PS computes a tuple (y
where ids is the above vector of commitment ids. PR then performs the ZK proof system ZKR 2PC , which is a conjunction of nr instances of the ZKDLEQ(. . .) ∧ ZKCom(. . .) proof system used in Step 1 of Pcot, one per each tuple (r i ,
, and nr instances of the ZKBit(C (i) ) proof.
Step 2: On receiving the Start2PC, ids, C, ... message and verifying the ZK proofs, PS retrieves its commitments Com cid S1 , ..., Com cid Sns specified in the ids string, and sends to PR a garbled version of circuit C computed on these inputs:
Complete2PC ids, {C These values are defined in Section 5. PS also performs the ZK proof CorrectYao.
Step 3: PR verifies the ZK proof CorrectYao, evaluates the garbled circuit and outputs its result. (Optionally, PR can send back to PS the wire keys corresponding to PS's output wires.) 
are replaced by commitments to the corresponding wire keys. As in the original Yao's protocol, S creates a ciphertext for each row of the truth table, encrypting the output-wire key corresponding to this row's output bit under the two input-wire keys corresponding to this row's input bits. The ciphertexts must be randomly shuffled to prevent R from learning which row (b A , b B , g(b A , b B ) ) of the truth table he succeeds in decrypting. S picks two random bits, σ A and σ B , which determine, intuitively, if the values corresponding to the A and B wires are "switched" or not. (If w is S's input wire, than σ w is equal to S's input bit on that wire.) If the rows are denoted in binary as 00, 01, 10, 11, then the first ciphertext received by R corresponds to row σ A σ B , the second to rowσ A σ B , the third to row σ AσB , and the fourth to rowσ AσB .
S creates the ciphertext list (E 00 , E 01 , E 10 , and E 11 ) using a two-key encryption scheme E αβ = 2KEnc x1, x2 (x), where for each α, β, x 1 = x Here ZKS w refers to the proof performed by the sender in the instance of the COT protocol that corresponds to receiver's wire w ∈ W R . ZKPlainEq2(E, C k , m) is the proof system for showing that E is an sCS encryption of plaintext m under key k committed in C k , and is a trivial simplification of the ZKPlainEq(E, C k , C m ) proof system for proving the same about commitment C m to m. Finally, CorrectGarble g proves that the ciphertext table E 00 , E 01 , E 10 , E 11 corresponding to garbled gate g is formed correctly, where E αβ = (D αβ , F fig. 4 is a UC-secure realization of the Committed 2PC functionality F 2PC in the CRS model.
